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Abstract 
 
Over the years, the legal minimum dropout age has been raised to 18 in 21 states.  
Although these policy changes are often promoted for their educational benefits, 
they have also been shown to reduce crimes committed by youths in the affected 
age groups.  However, an unintended consequence of increasing the minimum 
dropout age could be the displacement of crime and delinquency from the streets 
to schools.  To examine this issue, we use data from the national Youth Risk 
Behavior Surveys to estimate the relationship between minimum dropout age laws 
and student victimization.  Our results suggest that higher minimum dropout ages 
increase the likelihood that females and younger students report missing days of 
school for fear of their safety and that younger students are more likely to report 
being threatened or injured with a weapon on school property.  Our results also 
yield some evidence that students are more likely to report being victims of in-
school theft when the minimum dropout age is higher. 
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1. Introduction 
 
 Over the last three decades, nearly half of all states have changed their policy to raise the 
minimum age at which high school students are allowed to drop out of school.1  Since 2009, 
Alabama, Michigan, Missouri, New Hampshire, Rhode Island, South Dakota, and West Virginia 
have all raised their minimum dropout ages (Vessel 2009; Bush 2010; Sanchez 2012).  
Ostensibly, these policy changes are intended to increase the educational achievements of 
residents and thereby improve economic outcomes for the individuals and for the state.  National 
Education Association President Dennis Van Roekel recently commented on minimum dropout 
age requirements by declaring, “Any young person without a high school diploma is at a severe 
disadvantage in our high-tech labor market with its accompanying demands for advanced 
education.  We can’t prepare students for the 21st century who aren’t in school” (National 
Education Association 2012).   
 In addition to the purported educational benefits, new research provides evidence that 
these policy changes have had the side effect of reducing crimes committed by youths in the 
affected age groups (Anderson 2012).  Specifically, Anderson (2012) found that increasing the 
minimum dropout age (hereafter MDA) to 18 was associated with large reductions in property 
and violent crime arrest rates among 16 to 18 year-old males.2  Moreover, his results were 
consistent with an incapacitation effect; keeping teenagers in school decreases the time and 
opportunity available to commit crimes.3    
                                                          
1 Currently, all states have a minimum dropout age of 16, 17, or 18. 
 
2 Anderson (2012) also found large effects for drug-related crimes, but these estimates were generally not 
statistically significant.  He also found the crime-reducing effect to be much less pronounced among females. 
 
3 Other research has found that stricter dropout laws have led to higher income (Oreopoulos 2006; Oreopoulos 
2007), better health (van Kippersluis et al. 2011; Kemptner et al. 2011), increased political involvement (Milligan et 
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 However, an unintended consequence of keeping youths from dropping out could be the 
displacement of criminal activity and delinquency back into schools, to the detriment of the 
academic achievement and quality of life of other students.4  In fact, efforts to raise the minimum 
dropout age are often met with the argument that mandating the attendance of students who no 
longer want to be in school can be disruptive to their classmates and unfair to teachers (Lewin 
2012).  This criticism is supported by Eckstein and Wolpin (1999) who found that youths who 
drop out of high school have different traits than those who graduate, including lower motivation 
and a lower consumption value of school attendance.5   
 Our study considers the contemporaneous relationship between education and crime from 
the perspective of the potential victims.  Specifically, we seek to quantify the relationship 
between MDA laws and student victimization.6  In doing so, our research represents one of the 
few attempts to analyze the sensitivity of student victimization to state-level education policy.7  
To estimate the relationship of interest, we rely on data from the national Youth Risky Behavior 
Surveys (YRBS).  The temporal and spatial variation in MDA laws allows us to obtain 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
al. 2004), a lower incidence of teenage childbearing (Black et al. 2008; Silles 2011), and a lower likelihood of adult 
criminality (Lochner and Moretti 2004). 
 
4 Given that Anderson (2012) relied on county-level arrest data, his results do not capture possible increases of 
within-school crime that do not end in arrest.  It is often documented that within-school crime is severely 
underreported to the police (Jeffrey 2012; Trump 2012). 
 
5 Bjerk (2012) describes important differences among high school dropouts.  
 
6 To our knowledge, Anderson (2012) was the first to study the issue of displaced delinquency due to MDA laws.  
He focused, however, on the asymmetric effects between males and females by analyzing the following outcomes:  
whether the respondent missed school for fear of safety during the past month, whether the respondent reported 
having had sexual intercourse during the past month, whether the respondent reported having ever been pregnant.   
Anderson’s (2012) results for the “having missed school for fear of safety” outcome are consistent with our 
estimates reported below and, interestingly, he also found that females are more likely to report recent sexual 
intercourse when the MDA is higher.   
 
7 Previous research has generally focused on school-level policies and is often descriptive in nature.  For examples, 
see Brown (2005), and Marachi et al. (2007).  Pennig (working paper, 2012) attempted to address the topic of 
displaced delinquency, but was limited by a too-short panel and little policy variation. 
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difference-in-difference-type estimates of the impact of keeping would-be dropouts in school.  
Our results provide evidence that younger students and girls are more likely to miss school for 
fear of their safety and that younger students are more likely to report being threatened or injured 
with a weapon on school property when the MDA is higher.  Our results also yield some 
evidence that students are more likely to report being victims of in-school theft when the MDA is 
higher.  
Our study fits within the broad literature on the determinants of student victimization and 
in-school crime.  Research has established that student victimization is sensitive to individual-
level characteristics such as age (Mühlenweg 2010), gender (Khoury-Kassabri 2010), race 
(Peguero 2009), and sexual orientation (Kosciw et al. 2008), and school-level factors such as 
school disorder, climate, and organization (Payne et al. 2003; Randa and Wilcox 2010), socio-
economic status (Khoury-Kassabri et al. 2004), and school size (Ferris and West 2004; Leung 
and Ferris 2008).  Lastly, and perhaps most relevant to our study, policies that affect attendance 
have been shown to impact violence within schools (Jacob and Lefgren 2003; Hansen and Lang 
2011).    
From an academic achievement perspective, it is vital to understand the factors that 
contribute to student victimization and school crime.  Not surprisingly, student exposure to 
violence and delinquency is associated with increased absenteeism and decreased student 
performance.  The National Center for Education Statistics (2006) reported that six percent of 
students avoided school or a school activity during the past six months because of fear of attack 
or harm.8  In a similar vein, Reid (1989) and Dake et al. (2003) found that victims of bullying are 
at increased risk of absenteeism, while Grogger (1997) found that both minor and moderate 
                                                          
8 This estimate is in line with rates reported in the YRBS data. 
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levels of school violence led to lower high school graduation rates and decreased the likelihood 
of college attendance.9  The effects on academic outcomes are likely due, in part, to the fact that 
delinquent students disrupt the learning process for others and divert resources away from 
teaching (Bowen and Bowen 1999).10    
 The remainder of this paper is organized as follows:  Section 2 describes the data; Section 
3 lays out the empirical strategy; Section 4 discusses the results; Section 5 concludes.  
 
2.  Data 
 This paper is based on data from the national YRBS for the period 1993 through 2009.11  
The national YRBS is conducted every other year by the Centers for Disease Control and 
Prevention (CDC) and provides a nationally representative sample of U.S. high school 
students.12  The YRBS data are suited to address a range of topics on youth behavior, and have 
been frequently employed to examine the impacts of state-level policies.13  The goal of the 
survey is to collect information on youth behaviors that impact health.  Each wave, students are 
                                                          
9 Grogger (1997) used principal reports of student-student and student-teacher conflicts as his measure of violence.  
His findings were robust even when controlling for the individual’s family background and own disruptive behavior. 
 
10 Others have also found that negative social interactions at school increase the risk of depression and suicidality 
(Klomek et al. 2007; Hansen and Lang 2012). 
   
11 The national YRBS was initially conducted in 1991.  However, we omitted this survey wave from the analysis 
because it is based on relatively few schools.  We also explored the possibility of including results based on the state 
YRBS.  Like the national YRBS, the state YRBS is school-based and contains information on student victimization.  
Unfortunately, due to the limited coverage of states in these data that changed their legislation, there was insufficient 
policy variation to credibly estimate the effects of MDA laws. 
 
12 Although intended to be nationally representative, not all 50 states are represented in any given year the survey 
has been conducted. 
 
13 For examples, see Anderson (2010) on the effect of an anti-methamphetamine campaign on teen meth use; 
Tremblay and Ling (2005) on the relationship between AIDS education and youth sexual behavior; Carpenter and 
Cook (2008) on the effect of cigarette taxes on youth smoking; Cawley et al. (2007) on the impact of state physical 
education requirements on youth physical activity and obesity; Hansen et al. (2011) on the social market for 
cigarettes in high school; Taber et al. (2011) on the effectiveness of state policies targeting junk food in schools. 
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asked questions about eating and exercise habits, the use of alcohol, tobacco, and drugs, sexual 
activity, and other health behaviors that may adversely influence their physical and emotional 
wellbeing.  In addition to health behaviors, students are also asked about victimization and 
violence within school.  We use questions from this portion of the survey to gauge the extent to 
which crime and delinquency are displaced from the streets to schools when the minimum 
dropout age is higher.14  The data also provide information on standard student demographic 
characteristics, and we employ the restricted use state-identified versions of the national YRBS 
to link each student with their state of residence. 
 
3.  Empirical Strategy 
 Our empirical analysis is reduced-form, based on the approach taken by previous 
researchers interested in the effects of MDA laws.15  Implicit to the relationship between MDA 
laws and student victimization is that these laws impact attendance rates.  Indeed, a large body of 
research has confirmed that stricter dropout laws reduce dropout rates.  For example, Angrist and 
Krueger (1991) found that 25 percent of potential dropouts in the United States stay in school 
because of compulsory schooling laws.16 
 To examine the relationship between MDA laws and within-school victimization, we 
exploit the temporal and spatial variation of these laws and estimate difference-in-difference-
                                                          
14 Studies such as Dukarm et al. (1996) have used the national YRBS to examine determinants of delinquent and 
violent behavior among high school students.   
 
15 For examples of other research that has taken a reduced-form approach to analyze the effects of compulsory 
schooling, see Lleras-Muney (2002), Wenger (2002), Black et al. (2008), and Oreopoulos (2009). 
 
16 Other research on the effectiveness of compulsory schooling is consistent with Angrist and Krueger (1991).  For 
examples, see Wenger (2002), Lochner and Moretti (2004), Li (2006), and Oreopoulos (2009). 
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type models that control for both unobserved state-level heterogeneity and national trends.  
Specifically, our baseline equation is: 
 
(1)   Yist = β0 + β1(MDAst > 16) + Xistβ2 + Zstβ3 + vs + wt + εist 
 
where i indexes individuals, s indexes states, t indexes years, and vs and wt represent state fixed 
effects and year effects, respectively.  The variable MDAst > 16 is an indicator for whether the 
minimum dropout age is higher than 16 in state s and year t.  The coefficient of interest, β1, 
represents the effect of a higher MDA.  The dependent variable, Yist, represents one of the five 
following possible binary outcomes:  whether the student was threatened or injured with a 
weapon on school property in the past 12 months, whether the student was in a physical fight on 
school property in the past 12 months, whether the student missed school for fear of his/her 
safety in the past 30 days, whether the student was offered, sold, or given an illegal drug on 
school property in the past 12 months, whether the student had property stolen or damaged on 
school property in the past 12 months.17  The descriptive statistics for these binary indicators are 
shown in Table 1.  In some specifications, we add a term to control for state-specific linear time 
trends to account for omitted factors that trend smoothly over time at the state level. 
 The vectors Xist and Zst are comprised of the individual-level and state-level controls listed 
in Table 1, respectively.  In particular, we control for the student’s gender, age, grade level, and 
race.  In addition, we include the state-level unemployment rate and income per capita.  The 
unemployment data come from the Bureau of Labor Statistics, while the income per capita data 
come from the Bureau of Economic Analysis.  Previous studies have shown that youth criminal 
                                                          
17 Information on property crimes was not collected in the national YRBS in 2009.  As a result, we analyze the 
period 1993 through 2007 for this outcome. 
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behavior is sensitive to economic conditions (Hashimoto 1987; Grogger 1998).  All regressions 
are estimated as linear probability models and standard errors are corrected for clustering at the 
state level (Bertrand et al. 2004). 
 
4.  Results 
Table 2 presents results based on the full sample and show the estimated impact of our 
variable of interest, MDAst > 16, on the five outcome variables for each of three specifications.  
Estimates in column (1) are based on a specification that includes only state fixed effects and 
year effects; estimates in column (2) are based on a specification that also includes the covariates 
listed in Table 1; and estimates in column (3) are based on the preferred specification that adds 
state-specific linear time trends.  The data are weighted by the sample weights supplied by the 
YRBS.   
 As a whole, students report few changes in the school environment as a result of 
increasing the minimum dropout age.  Violent behavior, as measured by threats/injuries with a 
weapon (Panel A) or fighting on school property (Panel B), appears to be unaffected by the 
MDA.  In Panel C, point estimates indicate a modest increase of just over one percentage point 
in the incidence of students missing school for fear of safety, but this estimate is not precisely 
measured.18  The availability of drugs on school property (Panel D) also appears to be unaffected 
by the MDA.  The single outcome that does show a response to changing MDA laws is the 
incidence of property crime; Panel E illustrates point estimates that imply a four to six 
percentage point increase in property crimes, with two of the estimates showing statistical 
                                                          
18 It is worth mentioning that we update the “miss school for fear of safety” results from Anderson (2012) by 
analyzing a longer time period. 
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significance at the 0.05 level.  This effect is substantial, as the average incidence of property 
crime is just over 30 percent.  This finding is consistent with the notion that property crimes are 
displaced from the streets to schools when the MDA is higher. 
 While the estimates from Table 2 are informative, they may mask important 
heterogeneous effects.  Guided by predictions from routine activity theory, we explore whether 
the relationship between MDA laws and student victimization depends on gender or age.  Within 
this framework, the potential offenders are the would-be dropouts and the more vulnerable 
students (e.g. younger students or females) represent attractive targets for a range of delinquent 
and aggressive behaviors (Cohen and Felson 1979).19  The first two columns of Table 3 illustrate 
results separately for males and females.  The estimates for males are never statistically 
distinguishable from zero and are positive in only two of the five regressions.  The estimates for 
females, however, are always positive in sign.  Moreover, the results indicate that the incidence 
of girls missing school for fear of safety (Panel C) increases by nearly four percentage points 
when the MDA is higher.  This effect is statistically significant at the 0.05 level and is large in 
magnitude.  
 The last two columns of Table 3 compare estimates for students under the age of 16 with 
estimates for students 16 years of age or older.20  Panel A illustrates that younger students report 
over a four percentage point increase in the likelihood of being threatened or injured with a 
weapon on school property when the MDA is higher.  This effect is statistically significant at the 
0.05 level and is large in magnitude.  Similarly, younger students also report a nearly three 
                                                          
19 Within routine activity theory, teachers, administrators, and other staff represent capable guardians who cannot 
always be present in school or at school events.  
 
20 An additional benefit of restricting the sample to students under the age of 16 is that it ensures our estimates do 
not incorporate information from students who are kept in school because of a higher MDA.  In all states, students 
under the age of 16 are legally obligated to attend school. 
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percentage point increase in the fraction missing school for fear of safety (Panel C) when the 
MDA is higher and this estimate is statistically significant at the 0.05 level.    The estimates for 
students 16 years of age or older do not show the same pattern; there are some positive point 
estimates, but these are never statistically significant.  In fact, older students appear somewhat 
less likely to be threatened or injured with a weapon on school property when the MDA is 
higher; however, this estimate is only weakly statistically significant.21   
 
5.  Conclusion 
This study examines a possible unintended consequence of changing minimum dropout 
age laws.  Increasing the minimum dropout age could lead to more delinquents being kept in 
school, and these individuals may impose costs on other students due to their presence.  Possible 
consequences include increased bullying, threats, and gang activity or simply a decrease in the 
perception of school safety.  We quantify the relationship between state-level MDA laws and 
various measures of student victimization, using data from the national Youth Risk Behavior 
Surveys.  Our results indicate modest impacts on students’ experiences of property crime and 
stronger evidence that younger students and females experience increased violence and concerns 
about school safety.  School administrators and policymakers should take these potential 
consequences into account and act to mitigate them when there are increases in the minimum 
dropout age. 
Future research should extend our analysis to other outcomes that may be influenced by 
keeping possible delinquents in school longer.  A growing literature suggests that exposure to 
negative peer effects in school not only impedes academic performance (Robertson and Symons 
                                                          
21 In alternative specifications, we assessed the sensitivity of our estimates to the inclusion of proxies for school 
environment.  Our results were robust to the inclusion of these variables.  For the sake of brevity, these estimates are 
not included, but are available from the authors upon request.  
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2003; Carrell and Hoekstra 2010), but increases the likelihood of substance use (Gaviria and 
Raphael 2001; Kawaguchi 2004; Powell et al. 2005; Lundborg 2006), misbehavior in the 
classroom (Carrell and Hoekstra 2010), and cheating (Carrell et al. 2008).  Lastly, because high 
schools in the United States differ widely in their dropout and completion rates, future research 
might also want to consider important heterogeneous effects.  Despite the fact that dropout rates 
have not been measured uniformly across states, it could still be possible to study the broad 
differences in school outcomes as MDA laws have changed over the years.   
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     T able 1. Descriptive statistics: YRBS 1993-2009     
              MDA > 16  MDA = 16   
  Dependent variables 
  Threatened or injured with a weapon on school   0.082   0.082    
  property in past 12 months 
 
  In a fight on school property in past 12 months  0.141   0.138    
 
 
  Missed school for fear of safety in past 30 days   0.068   0.062    
 
 
  Offered an illegal drug on school property in   0.281   0.260    
  past 12 months 
 
  Property stolen or damaged on school property   0.317   0.302    
  in past 12 months 
 
  Independent variables 
  Male           0.496   0.487 
 
  Age less than 15         0.095   0.092    
 
  Age = 15          0.220   0.223  
 
  Age = 16           0.254   0.259  
 
  Age = 17          0.264   0.262 
 
  Age 18 or older         0.167   0.164    
 
  Grade 9           0.244   0.240   
  
  Grade 10          0.243   0.248 
 
  Grade 11          0.252   0.255   
 
  Grade 12          0.259   0.254 
 
  Ungraded          0.002   0.003    
 
  Black           0.198   0.291 
 
  White           0.341   0.418    
 
  Other race          0.461   0.291 
 
  Unemployment rate        6.181   5.483    
  
  Real state income         28,487   29,092      
 
  N            71,931   57,863    
  Notes:  Based on unweighted data from the national YRBS.  The number of observations  
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  for the independent variables match the sample from Panel A in Table 2. 
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   Table 2. Minimum dropout age laws and within-school delinquency    
  Panel A: Threatened or injured with a weapon on school property in past 12 months 
 MDA > 16     0.009    0.006    0.005    
        (0.007)   (0.005)   (0.011)   
 
 N       129,794   129,794   129,794      
  Panel B: In a fight on school property in past 12 months 
 MDA > 16     -0.004    -0.012    -0.001    
        (0.012)   (0.009)   (0.010)   
 
 N       127,922   127,922   127,922      
  Panel C: Missed school for fear of safety in past 30 days 
 MDA > 16     0.017    0.013    0.013     
        (0.017)   (0.016)   (0.010)   
 
 N          129,769   129,769   129,769      
  Panel D: Offered an illegal drug on school property in past 12 months 
 MDA > 16     -0.007    -0.009    0.032    
        (0.020)   (0.018)   (0.034)   
 
 N       128,683   128,683   128,683      
  Panel E: Property stolen or damaged on school property in past 12 months   
 MDA > 16     0.047**   0.057***   0.037    
        (0.019)   (0.021)   (0.051)   
 
 N       84,869    84,869    84,869       
 State Fixed Effects  Yes    Yes    Yes     
 Year Effects    Yes    Yes    Yes     
 Covariates     No     Yes    Yes     
 State Trends    No     No     Yes       
 * Statistically significant at 10% level; ** at 5% level; *** at 1% level. 
 
 Notes:  Each cell represents the results from a separate linear probability model.  The samples in Panels A 
 through D are based on YRBS data for the period 1993 through 2009.  The sample in Panel E is based on  
 YRBS data for the period 1993 through 2007.  The covariates are listed in Table 1.  Standard errors,  
 corrected for  clustering at the state level, are in parentheses and regressions are weighted using the sample 
 weights from the YRBS.   
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 Table 3. Minimum dropout age laws and within-school delinquency by gender and age    
 Panel A: Threatened or injured with a weapon on school property in past 12 months  
       Male   Female   Age < 16  Age ≥ 16  
MDA > 16     -0.010   0.019    0.043**  -0.016*  
       (0.014)  (0.019)   (0.016)  (0.010) 
 
N       63,830   65,964    40,940   88,854      
 Panel B: In a fight on school property in past 12 months       
       Male   Female   Age < 16  Age ≥ 16  
MDA > 16     -0.009   0.003    0.023   -0.015   
       (0.044)  (0.036)   (0.025)  (0.016) 
 
N       62,693   65,229    40,250   87,672      
 Panel C: Missed school for fear of safety in past 30 days      
       Male   Female   Age < 16  Age ≥ 16  
MDA > 16     -0.013   0.039**   0.027**  0.004     
       (0.016)  (0.015)   (0.013)  (0.012) 
 
N            63,819   65,950    40,936   88,833      
 Panel D: Offered an illegal drug on school property in past 12 months   
       Male   Female   Age < 16  Age ≥ 16  
MDA > 16     0.011   0.044    0.015   0.040  
       (0.053)  (0.055)   (0.034)  (0.039) 
 
N       63,166   65,517    40,607   88,076      
 Panel E: Property stolen or damaged on school property in past 12 months 
       Male   Female   Age < 16  Age ≥ 16  
MDA > 16     0.058   0.011    0.008   0.051 
       (0.063)  (0.042)   (0.044)  (0.065) 
 
N       41,890   42,979    26,774   58,095      
State Fixed Effects  Yes   Yes    Yes   Yes 
Year Effects    Yes   Yes    Yes   Yes  
Covariates     Yes   Yes    Yes   Yes 
State Trends    Yes   Yes    Yes   Yes      
* Statistically significant at 10% level; ** at 5% level; *** at 1% level. 
 
Notes:  Each cell represents the results from a separate linear probability model.  The samples in Panels A through D 
are based on YRBS data for the period 1993 through 2009.  The sample in Panel E is based on YRBS data for the 
period 1993 through 2007.  The covariates are listed in Table 1.  Standard errors, corrected for clustering at the state 
level, are in parentheses and regressions are weighted using the sample weights from the YRBS.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
